Search results “Elliptic curve cryptography vulnerabilities and threats”
Vulnerabilities, Threat Vectors, and Probability - CompTIA Security+ SY0-401: 2.1
Security+ Training Course Index: http://professormesser.link/sy0401 Professor Messer’s Course Notes: http://professormesser.link/sy0401cn Frequently Asked Questions: http://professormesser.link/faq - - - - - The bad guys are very good at infiltrating our computer systems. In this video, you’ll learn about system vulnerabilities, examples of threat vectors, and how to calculate the probability of a security risk. - - - - - Download entire video course: http://professormesser.link/401adyt Get the course on MP3 audio: http://professormesser.link/401vdyt Subscribe to get the latest videos: http://professormesser.link/yt Calendar of live events: http://www.professormesser.com/calendar/ FOLLOW PROFESSOR MESSER: Professor Messer official website: http://www.professormesser.com/ Twitter: http://www.professormesser.com/twitter Facebook: http://www.professormesser.com/facebook Instagram: http://www.professormesser.com/instagram Google +: http://www.professormesser.com/googleplus
Views: 54804 Professor Messer
Cryptography Basics for Embedded Developers by Eystein Stenberg
Cryptography Basics for Embedded Developers - Eystein Stenberg, Mender Many vulnerabilities and breaches happen due to incorrect use of cryptographic mechanisms like encryption. This talk will cover the basic mechanisms of cryptography, like encryption, signatures, and key storage, looking at how these are used to create important security properties like authentication, confidentiality and integrity. Performance is particularly important for embedded development and we will cover which cryptographic operations are computationally expensive and why. We will highlight implementations of cryptographic mechanisms that help meet the performance needs of embedded devices, including Elliptic Curve Cryptography. We will wrap up with common pitfalls, libraries and tools relevant for secure use of cryptography for embedded devices. Eystein Stenberg has over 7 years of experience in security and systems management as a developer, a support engineer, a technical account manager, and now as a product manager. He has been in the front line of some of the largest production environments in various roles and has in-depth knowledge of the challenges in systems security in a real-world context. His holds a Master’s degree in cryptography and his writing credits include “Distributing a Private Key Generator in Ad Hoc Networks."
Cryptography Primer Session 4 Primes, Elliptic Curves, & Lattices
This will be the fourth of six cryptography primer sessions exploring the basics of modern cryptography. In this session, we’ll explore primality testing, elliptic curve cryptosystems, and lattice-based cryptosystems. Subsequent sessions (on alternating Fridays) are expected to include the following topics. Depending on the interests of the participants, other topics may be included or substituted. Attacks, vulnerabilities, and practical considerations Applications including zero-knowledge, secret sharing, homomorphic encryption, and election protocols.
Views: 378 Microsoft Research
Vulnerability Scanning - CompTIA Security+ SY0-501 - 1.5
Security+ Training Course Index: http://professormesser.link/sy0501 Professor Messer’s Course Notes: http://professormesser.link/501cn Frequently Asked Questions: http://professormesser.link/faq - - - - - A vulnerability scan can tell you a lot about potential threats. In this video, you’ll learn about different vulnerability scan types, the results of a vulnerability scan, and how to deal with false positives. - - - - - Subscribe to get the latest videos: http://professormesser.link/yt Calendar of live events: http://www.professormesser.com/calendar/ FOLLOW PROFESSOR MESSER: Professor Messer official website: http://www.professormesser.com/ Twitter: http://www.professormesser.com/twitter Facebook: http://www.professormesser.com/facebook Instagram: http://www.professormesser.com/instagram Google +: http://www.professormesser.com/googleplus
Views: 18377 Professor Messer
OpenSSL DSA Vulnerability - Daily Security Byte EP. 209
In this short, daily video post, Corey Nachreiner, CISSP and CTO for WatchGuard Technologies, shares the biggest InfoSec story from the day -- often sharing useful security tips where appropriate. Visit our blog post for full details: http://watchguardsecuritycenter.com
Views: 758 Corey Nachreiner
APPSEC Cali 2018 - What's New in TLS 1.3
Abstract: TLS 1.3 is just about here ! This talk will cover the more notable attacks against prior versions of TLS and examine their applicability to TLS 1.3. In doing so, important security related design decisions of TLS 1.3, which thwart these attacks, will be highlighted. We will also highlight the new protocol handshakes and how they can give rise to 0-RTT resumption. Finally, potential pitfalls of deploying TLS 1.3 and ways to avoid them will be discussed. Alex Balducci is a Principal Security Consultant at NCC Group's Cryptography Services. His experience includes security research, source code auditing, application security assessments, and software development - but his expertise is in cryptographic security including analysis and design of cryptographic protocols. Alex has given numerous presentations at several industry conferences. In 2015-2017 he delivered NCC Group's "Beyond the Beast: Deep Dives in Cryptography" course at Blackhat USA as well as at Blackhat EU in 2015. This two day course examines modern issues affecting cryptographic implementations and protocols and delves into the nitty gritty implementation details. At BlackHat USA 2014 he spoke on the topic of practical cryptographic vulnerabilities in application software covering RSA padding oracles and subgroup confinement attacks on elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman. Managed by the official OWASP Media Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Media_Project
Views: 1904 OWASP
CSS Keylogger - old is new again
This is "well known" research that resurfaces every other year. Let me tell you a story how I have heard about this in 2012 and putting it into perspective. Research "Scriptless Attacks – Stealing the Pie Without Touching the Sill" (2012): + Paper: https://www.nds.rub.de/media/emma/veroeffentlichungen/2012/08/16/scriptlessAttacks-ccs2012.pdf + Slides: https://www.slideshare.net/x00mario/stealing-the-pie + Talk recording: https://channel9.msdn.com/Events/Blue-Hat-Security-Briefings/BlueHat-Security-Briefings-Fall-2012-Sessions/BH1203 CSS Keylogger: https://github.com/maxchehab/CSS-Keylogging Stealing Data With CSS - Attack and Defense: https://www.mike-gualtieri.com/posts/stealing-data-with-css-attack-and-defense Twitter: + https://twitter.com/0x6D6172696F + https://twitter.com/sirdarckcat + https://twitter.com/garethheyes + https://twitter.com/thornmaker + https://twitter.com/mlgualtieri -------------------------------------- Twitter: https://twitter.com/LiveOverflow Website: http://liveoverflow.com/ Subreddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/LiveOverflow/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/LiveOverflow/
Views: 134908 LiveOverflow
Initialization Vector Attacks - CompTIA Security+ SY0-301: 3.4
See our entire index of CompTIA Security+ videos at http://www.FreeSecurityPlus.com - Initialization vectors are important to build strong encryption, but historical 802.11 WEP vulnerabilities were partly related to poor IV implementations.
Views: 19588 Professor Messer
What would happen to Bitcoin if Discrete Log were broken?
Discrete Log is one of those assumptions that Bitcoin rests on and there's at least one known vulnerability using Quantum Computing using Shor's Algorithm. How would this breaking affect Bitcoin? -------------------------- Seminar: http://programmingblockchain.com/ Newsletter: http://eepurl.com/cZr_Aj Medium: https://medium.com/@jimmysong Twitter: https://twitter.com/jimmysong Github: https://github.com/jimmysong
Whiteboard Wednesday: Logjam Vulnerability
John Wagnon discusses the high level details of the Logjam vulnerability and why BIG-IP's default ssl profiles protect against it. Read David Holmes blog on remediating logjram for non-offloaded ssl traffic with iRules here: https://devcentral.f5.com/articles/remediating-logjam-an-irule-countermeasure
Views: 3507 F5 DevCentral
#231 Ajay Prakash & Gavin Brennen: Qubit Protocol – Quantum Computing & The Coming Threat to Crypto
Support the show, consider donating: BTC: 1CD83r9EzFinDNWwmRW4ssgCbhsM5bxXwg (https://epicenter.tv/tipbtc) BCC: 1M4dvWxjL5N9WniNtatKtxW7RcGV73TQTd (http://epicenter.tv/tipbch) ETH: 0x8cdb49ca5103Ce06717C4daBBFD4857183f50935 (https://epicenter.tv/tipeth) With the advent of mature quantum technologies, many of the critical cryptographic protocols which secure the Internet, financial transactions and even military secrets may become susceptible to new attack vectors. For instance, while it may take a computer millions of years to decipher a public key’s corresponding private key, a sufficiently powerful quantum computer might achieve this in a reasonable amount of time. With this reality looming over us, many in the blockchain space worry that someone with access to a quantum computer might one day have the ability to steal their hard-earned crypto. We’re joined by Ajay Prakash and Gavin Brennen, founders of the Qubit Protocol, a decentralized blockchain-enabled governance protocol that is meant to select and fund the best startups in the quantum world. As a co-author of the recent paper “Quantum attacks on Bitcoin, and how to protect against them,” Gavin walks us through the primary threats that quantum computing poses on Bitcoin. Among the major vulnerabilities are hashing functions and Elliptic Curve algorithms used for digital signatures, both fundamental components of Bitcoin, as well as many other blockchain protocols. Topics discussed in this episode: - What are quantum technologies and how they differ from the existing paradigm - The areas and industries which are to benefit most from quantum computing - A refresher on hashing algorithms as one-way functions - What a quantum attack on Bitcoin mining might look like - How Elliptic Curve digital signature algorithms work and how public and private keys are generated - The three types of attacks a quantum computer could perform digital signatures - The expected timelines for these attacks to be viable - The potential countermeasures which could circumvent quantum attacks on Bitcoin - The Qubit Protocol as a DAO to fund quantum technology startups and the challenges of investing in the quantum space - The project’s roadmap and upcoming ICO Sponsors: - Shapeshift: Buy and sell alt coins instantly and securely without a centralized exchange - http://epicenter.tv/shapeshift This episode is also available on : - Epicenter.tv: https://epicenter.tv/231 - YouTube: http://youtu.be/sqfiNy27Fz0 - Souncloud: http://soundcloud.com/epicenterbitcoin/eb-231 Watch or listen, Epicenter is available wherever you get your podcasts. Epicenter is hosted by Brian Fabian Crain, Sébastien Couture & Meher Roy.
Views: 1282 Epicenter
Web Timing Attacks Made Practical
by Timothy Morgan & Jason Morgan Timing side-channel attacks are a well-known class of flaw in cryptographic systems and applications in general. While these issues have been researched for decades, the complexities involved in obtaining accurate timing measurements and performing accurate statistical analysis has prevented the average pentester from identifying and exploiting these issues on a day-to-day basis. In this paper, we build on past research to make remote timing attacks practical against modern web applications. We scrutinize both methods of data collection and statistical analysis used by previous researchers, significantly improving results in both areas. We implement an adaptive Kalman filter, which provides greater accuracy in classifying timing differences, making timing attacks more practical in congested networks and speeding up attacks in ideal conditions. As part of this research, a new open source timing attack tool suite is being released to the community.
Views: 5868 Black Hat
Assessing And Exploiting BigNum Vulnerabilities
by Ralf-Philipp Weinmann The majority of deployed asymmetric cryptography implementations (RSA, DH, ECDH/ECDSA with GF(p) curves) need to perform calculations on integers that are larger than a single machine word. Just like every software package, implementations of multi-precision integer arithmetic sometimes have bugs. This talk investigates the implications of these bugs and shows how they can be used by attackers to exploit asymmetric cryptographic primitives. Isolating bug patterns and understanding exploitation requirements allows us to develop strategies for automated bug hunting.
Views: 425 Black Hat
Breaking AES with ChipWhisperer - Piece of scake (Side Channel Analysis 100)
Terrible DPA explanation and sharing my experience solving the side channel analysis challenge "piece of scake" from the rhme2 CTF. A real DPA tutorial by Colin O'Flynn: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlX-p4AGhWs The ChipWhisperer AES tutorial: http://www.newae.com/sidechannel/cwdocs/tutorial.html ChipWhsiperer: http://newae.com/tools/chipwhisperer/ The DPA paper: https://www.rambus.com/introduction-to-differential-power-analysis-and-related-attacks/ rhme2 challenge files: https://github.com/Riscure/Rhme-2016 -------------------------------------- Twitter: https://twitter.com/LiveOverflow Website: http://liveoverflow.com/ Subreddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/LiveOverflow/
Views: 24509 LiveOverflow
Logjam and Breaking Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
Overview of Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, the Logjam Attack, and the current state of web security.
Views: 233 Devan Singh
Vulnerabilities in TLS (Part 1)
Video recording of Kenny Paterson's lecture (Part 1) at the COST Action IC1306 School on Cryptographic Attacks held in Porto on October 13-16, 2014.
Views: 765 CryptoAction
Timing and Lattice Attacks on a Remote ECDSA OpenSSL Server: How Practical Are They Really?
Explanation of this paper: http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/839 from David Wong it was filmed during a talk at the office of NCC Group
Views: 560 David Wong
BGP Overview
Jason Rahm reaches into his "router guy" past to give a brief overview on the border gateway routing protocol (bgp) that keeps the internet duct taped together. F5 specific BGP resources linked here on the DevCentral article: https://devcentral.f5.com/articles/lightboard-lessons-bgp-overview-29358
Views: 11950 F5 DevCentral
16. Side-Channel Attacks
MIT 6.858 Computer Systems Security, Fall 2014 View the complete course: http://ocw.mit.edu/6-858F14 Instructor: Nickolai Zeldovich In this lecture, Professor Zeldovich discusses side-channel attacks, specifically timing attacks. License: Creative Commons BY-NC-SA More information at http://ocw.mit.edu/terms More courses at http://ocw.mit.edu
Views: 8550 MIT OpenCourseWare
Crypto Defenses for Real-World System Threats - Kenn White - Ann Arbor
Modern encryption techniques provide several important security properties, well known to most practitioners. Or are they? What are in fact the guarantees of, say, HTTPS TLS cipher suites using authenticated encryption, IPSec vs. SSL VPNs, Property Preserving Encryption, or token vaults? We live in an era of embedded Hardware Security Modules that cost less than $1 in volume, and countless options now exist for encrypting streaming network data, files, volumes, and even entire databases. Let's take a deep dive into the edge of developed practice to discuss real-world threat scenarios to public cloud and IoT data, and look closely at how we can address specific technical risks with our current encryption toolkits. Advanced math not required. Bio: Kenneth White is a security researcher whose work focuses on networks and global systems. He is co-director of the Open Crypto Audit Project (OCAP), currently managing a large-scale audit of OpenSSL on behalf of the Linux Foundation's Core Infrastructure Initiative. Previously, White was Principal Scientist at Washington DC-based Social & Scientific Systems where he led the engineering team that designed and ran global operations and security for the largest clinical trial network in the world, with research centers in over 100 countries. White co-founded CBX Group which provides security services to major organizations including World Health, UNICEF, Doctors without Borders, the US State Department, and BAO Systems. Together with Matthew Green, White co-founded the TrueCrypt audit project, a community-driven initiative to conduct the first comprehensive cryptanalysis and public security audit of the widely used TrueCrypt encryption software. White holds a Masters from Harvard and is a PhD candidate in neuroscience and cognitive science, with applied research in real-time classification and machine learning. His work on network security and forensics and been cited by media including the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, Reuters, Wired and Nature. White is a technical reviewer for the Software Engineering Institute, and publishes and speaks frequently on computational modeling, security engineering, and trust. He tweets @kennwhite.
Views: 819 Duo Security
Perfect Forward Secrecy Side Effects
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is a great security feature that protects client and server data from being decrypted in the future. In this video, John discusses a few of the things to keep in mind as you move toward PFS ciphers.
Views: 2706 F5 DevCentral
EB50 – BTC2B Conference: Nicolas Courtois & potential security vulnerabilities in Bitcoin ECDSA
Support the show, consider donating: 39rFJA7bHRREpgghnZKzKbYrQEPVX9P3Fj (http://bit.ly/1wl0Ivn) Nicolas Courtois is a cryptographer and senior lecturer at University College London. He has been studying cryptocurrencies for some time and has written a number of papers on bitcoin. His talk is titled "Cryptographic Security of ECDSA in bitcoin" in which he exposes the security vulnerabilities in the specific variation of the Elliptic Curve digital Signature Algorithm used in bitcoin. Links mentioned in this episode: - Slides for this presentation: http://www.nicolascourtois.com/bitcoin/paycoin_ECDSA_survey_Brussels_2014_3abcd.pdf - Nicolas Courtois’s Wikipedia Page: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolas_Courtois - Personal blog: http://blog.bettercrypto.com/ - On The Longest Chain Rule and Programmed Self-Destruction of Crypto Currencies paper: http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.0534 - Nicolas’s Bitcoin Publications: http://blog.bettercrypto.com/?page_id=63 Show notes: http://epicenterbitcoin.com/podcast/050 YouTube: http://youtu.be/-nHKhN4XpMw SoundCloud: http://soundcloud.com/epicenterbitcoin/eb-050 Epicenter Bitcoin is hosted by Brian Fabian Crain & Sébastien Couture. - Visit our website: http://epicenterbitcoin.com - Subscribe to our newsletter: http://epicenterbitcoin.com/newsletter - Twitter: http://twitter.com/epicenterbtc
Views: 261 Epicenter
Injection Vulnerabilities - or: How I got a free Burger
One night I ordered food and I accidentally injected a Burger into the order. The delivery guy confused a comment as another item on the order list and made it. Even though no price was attached to it. -------------------------------------- Twitter: https://twitter.com/LiveOverflow Website: http://liveoverflow.com/ Subreddit: https://www.reddit .com/r/LiveOverflow/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/LiveOverflow
Views: 150936 LiveOverflow
PGP Encryption Explained
DISCLAIMER: Researchers have recently discovered a major vulnerability with PGP encryption. We recommend that you stop relying on PGP for encrypted communications and switch to a different secure communications method for now. More on the PGP vulnerability here: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/05... ---- PGP stands for Pretty Good Privacy. It’s an encryption standard that is used worldwide to encrypt email communications. In this tutorial we will see how PGP works before looking at simple ways to use it on a daily email exchange.
Bitcoin - The security of transaction block chains
A detailed explanation of what makes bitcoin transaction block chains secure. More free lessons at: http://www.khanacademy.org/video?v=8zgvzmKZ5vo Video by Zulfikar Ramzan. Zulfikar Ramzan is a world-leading expert in computer security and cryptography and is currently the Chief Scientist at Sourcefire. He received his Ph.D. in computer science from MIT
Views: 80221 Khan Academy
J. Alex Halderman, Nadia Heninger: Logjam: Diffie-Hellman, discrete logs, the NSA, and you
Earlier this year, we discovered that Diffie-Hellman key exchange – cornerstone of modern cryptography – is less secure in practice than the security community believed. In this talk, we’ll explain how the NSA is likely exploiting this weakness to allow it to decrypt connections to at least 20% of HTTPS websites, 25% of SSH servers, and 66% of IPsec VPNs. J. Alex Halderman, Nadia Heninger
Views: 1987 media.ccc.de
USENIX Security '17 - Constant-Time Callees with Variable-Time Callers
Cesar Pereida García and Billy Bob Brumley, Tampere University of Technology Side-channel attacks are a serious threat to security-critical software. To mitigate remote timing and cache-timing attacks, many ubiquitous cryptography software libraries feature constant-time implementations of cryptographic primitives. In this work, we disclose a vulnerability in OpenSSL 1.0.1u that recovers ECDSA private keys for the standardized elliptic curve P-256 despite the library featuring both constant-time curve operations and modular inversion with microarchitecture attack mitigations. Exploiting this defect, we target the errant modular inversion code path with a cache-timing and improved performance degradation attack, recovering the inversion state sequence. We propose a new approach of extracting a variable number of nonce bits from these sequences, and improve upon the best theoretical result to recover private keys in a lattice attack with as few as 50 signatures and corresponding traces. As far as we are aware, this is the first timing attack against OpenSSL ECDSA that does not target scalar multiplication, the first side-channel attack on crypto-systems leveraging P-256 constant-time scalar multiplication and furthermore, we extend our attack to TLS and SSH protocols, both linked to OpenSSL for P-256 ECDSA signing. View the full program: https://www.usenix.org/sec17/program
Views: 177 USENIX
ShmooCon 2014: Malicious Threats, Vulnerabilities in Mobile Instant Messaging Platforms
For more information visit: http://bit.ly/shmooc14 To download the video visit: http://bit.ly/shmooc14_down Playlist Shmoocon 2014: http://bit.ly/shmooc14_pl Speakers: Jaime Sanchez | Pablo San Emeterio Global surveillance emerged as a phenomenon since the late 1940s and Internet and mobile technology are being developed with such pace that it is impossible to guarantee electronic privacy and nobody should expect it. How strong are the actual Instant Messaging Platforms? Do they take care of our security and privacy? We'll look inside the security of several clients (like BBM, Snapchat, and Line) and will put our focus on WhatsApp. WhatsApp might not be as widely known as Twitter, but the company announced that it has passed 350 million active monthly users. WhatsApp has been plagued by several security issues in the past, so we decided to start the research. We've discovered several vulnerabilities more that we'll disclosure (with proof of concept code), including encryption flaws, remote DOS (making the client crash by sending a custom message), or how to spoof messages manipulating sender address information. We'll also release a new version of our tool with different protection layers: encryption, anonymity, and using a custom XMPP server. It's necessary to implement additional measures until WhatsApp decides to take security seriously.
Views: 851 Christiaan008
Theory and Practice of Cryptography
Google Tech Talks December, 12 2007 ABSTRACT Topics include: Introduction to Modern Cryptography, Using Cryptography in Practice, Proofs of Security and Security Definitions and A Special Topic in Cryptography Speaker: Steve Weis Steve Weis received his PhD from the Cryptography and Information Security group at MIT, where he was advised by Ron Rivest. He is a member of Google's Applied Security (AppSec) team and is the technical lead for Google's internal cryptographic library, KeyMaster.
Views: 41271 GoogleTechTalks
Cracking Windows by Atom Bombing - Computerphile
A security exploit using standard Windows commands which can lie undetected. Dr Steve Bagley explains the latest revealed exploit. Password Cracking: https://youtu.be/7U-RbOKanYs Google Deep Dream: https://youtu.be/BsSmBPmPeYQ FPS & Digital Video: https://youtu.be/yniSnYtkrwQ Read more about this exploit here: http://bit.ly/ComputerphileAtom http://www.facebook.com/computerphile https://twitter.com/computer_phile This video was filmed and edited by Sean Riley. Computer Science at the University of Nottingham: http://bit.ly/nottscomputer Computerphile is a sister project to Brady Haran's Numberphile. More at http://www.bradyharan.com
Views: 238237 Computerphile
Daniel J. Bernstein - How to manipulate standards - project bullrun
Daniel J. Bernstein - How to manipulate standards - project bullrun Daniel Julius Bernstein (sometimes known simply as djb; born October 29, 1971) is a German-American[2] mathematician, cryptologist, programmer, and professor of mathematics and computer science at the Eindhoven University of Technology and research professor at the University of Illinois at Chicago. His computer software programs qmail, publicfile, and djbdns were released as license-free software. This was used by some of the people that were offended by his criticism to stop the distribution of his software, so that Linux distributions such as Debian which used qmail internally did not distribute qmail. OpenBSD a security focused operating system had the majority of its security exploits as a result of its decision to stay with Sendmail and BIND and removed qmail and djbdns from its ports as part of the license dispute. This issue was resolved when Bernstein released the source code of his projects into public domain software in 2007. Bernstein designed his Salsa20 stream cipher in 2005 and submitted to eSTREAM for review, another variant, ChaCha20, is published by him in 2008. He also designed Curve25519, a public key cryptography scheme based on elliptic curve in 2005, and worked as the lead researcher on its Ed25519 implementation of EdDSA. Without any adoptions at first, after nearly a decade later, Edward Snowden's disclosure about the mass surveillance by the National Security Agency, especially a backdoor inside Dual_EC_DRBG, suspicions of the NIST's P curve constants[3] led to concerns[4] that the NSA had chosen values that gave them an advantage in factoring[5] public keys.[6] Since then Curve25519 and EdDSA has attracted much attention and became the de facto replacement of NIST P curve. Google has also selected ChaCha20 along with Bernstein's Poly1305 message authentication code as a replacement for RC4 in TLS, which is used for Internet security.[7] Many protocols based on his works have now standardized and used in a variety of applications, such as Apple iOS,[8] Linux kernel,[9] OpenSSH,[10][11] and Tor.[12]
Views: 289 Thomas D
Peerlyst Community TV Episode 9: Is ECC a Better Choice than RSA?
Guest Expert: Nathan McMahon Avi Networks , speaking about ECC vs. RSA
Views: 65 Peerlyst Inc
Format String Vulnerabilities Primer (Part 1 The Basics)
Full Video Details: http://www.securitytube.net/video/343
Views: 9392 TheSecurityTube
Recover RSA private key from public keys - rhme2 Key Server (crypto 200)
Using the greatest common divisor (GCD) to factorize the public modulo into the secret primes, so we can forge a RSA signature. Source for the rhme2 challenges: https://github.com/Riscure/Rhme-2016 -------------------------------------- Twitter: https://twitter.com/LiveOverflow Website: http://liveoverflow.com/ Subreddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/LiveOverflow/
Views: 30636 LiveOverflow
HTTPS & TLS in 2016: Security practices from the front lines - AppSecUSA 2016
Recorded at AppSecUSA 2016 in Washington, DC https://2016.appsecusa.org/ HTTPS & TLS in 2016: Security practices from the front lines Implementing strong security for Internet‐facing services has grown more challenging and more complex over the past two years. With protocol‐level vulnerabilities like FREAK, BEAST, CRIME, POODLE, & LOGJAM, Ops teams are forced to reevaluate long‐held assumptions about foundation system network code. What are the right tradeoffs between modern network security requirements versus widespread legacy client and user interoperability? How do we apply these to traditional Apache and Nginx servers, mobile app web services, and non‐browser infrastructure like libcurl, proxies, API endpoints, and load balancers? And what's the deal with Curve25519, ChaCha/Poly1305, LibSodium, BoringSSL, and LibreSSL? Here, we present a practitioner's crash guide to modern site and web service endpoint encryption using HTTPS. We cover the "TLS 101" (and 201) fundamentals of certificates: ECDSA vs RSA, 2K vs 4K, ephemeral Diffie‐ Hellman (elliptic curve versus static), Domain Validation vs Extended Validation. We'll talk about intermediate and root authorities (and why Superfish is such a problem), and then look at some best practices around https including certificate transparency (CT), pinning (HPKP), and strict transport security (HSTS). Lastly, we'll give updates from the OpenSSL 1.1 audit, and point to well curated configuration guides and recipes for https and TLS. Speakers Eric Mill Eric Mill is a software engineer and advocate for a web that is safe and secure for all of its users. Eric is currently an advisor and engineer in a federal government agency, and has previously worked at the Sunlight Foundation on open data infrastructure and policy. Kenneth White Director, Open Crypto Audit Project Kenneth White is a security researcher whose work focuses on networks and global systems. He is Director of the Open Crypto Audit Project (OCAP), currently managing a large‐scale audit of OpenSSL on behalf of the Linux Foundation's Core Infrastructure Initiative. In his day job, White leads an applied R&D team for Dovel Labs, working with federal clients on mission system security and cloud automation. - Managed by the official OWASP Media Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Media_Project
Views: 2233 OWASP
Security on Apache Mesos (Alexander Rojas & Adam Bordelon, Mesosphere)
Handling personally identifiable information, meeting legal requirements for data protection and confidentiality, or enabling multi-tenancy makes security a necessity in today’s enterprises. From financial and healthcare services to cloud and eCommerce providers, enterprises can’t afford weaknesses or vulnerabilities in their platforms. Security is one of the major pursuits of Apache Mesos because it reduces the amount of concerns operators have to worry about. As such, every year a lot of work is done to reduce the work of operators when running their clusters. This talk, given at MesosCon EU 2017 in Prague, discusses the basics of security on Apache Mesos, such as firewall off the perimeter, encryption, authentication, and container isolation. Adam Bordelon and Alexander Rojas of Mesosphere talk about authentication and authorization of the V1 API, executor authentication (JWT, claims), secrets as first class citizens, elliptic curve cryptography support, and enhanced isolation and show how you can improve your application’s security with Apache Mesos. About the speakers: Adam Bordelon is a distributed systems architect at Mesosphere and an Apache Mesos committer. Before joining Mesosphere, Adam lead development on Hadoop core at MapR, built distributed systems for recommendations at Amazon, and re-architected the LabVIEW compiler at National Instruments. He completed his Master’s degree at Rice University, building a tool to analyze supercomputer performance data for bottlenecks and anomalies. Alexander Rojas is a software engineer at Mesosphere Hamburg. He has been contributing to the Apache Mesos project over the last year. Before joining Mesosphere, Alexander worked on distributed rendering systems at 3DExcite. He studied Computer Systems at the National University of Colombia and later did some studies in Computational Logic at the Technical University of Dresden.
Views: 29 Mesosphere
Running an SQL Injection Attack - Computerphile
Just how bad is it if your site is vulnerable to an SQL Injection? Dr Mike Pound shows us how they work. Cookie Stealing: https://youtu.be/T1QEs3mdJoc Rob Miles on Game Playing AI: https://youtu.be/5oXyibEgJr0 Secure Web Browsing: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E_wX40fQwEA Deep Learning: https://youtu.be/l42lr8AlrHk Tom Scott on SQL Injection: https://youtu.be/_jKylhJtPmI http://www.facebook.com/computerphile https://twitter.com/computer_phile This video was filmed and edited by Sean Riley. Computer Science at the University of Nottingham: http://bit.ly/nottscomputer Computerphile is a sister project to Brady Haran's Numberphile. More at http://www.bradyharan.com
Views: 1165920 Computerphile
Discussion on The Birthday Attack
This is a discussion video on the birthday attack, the birthday paradox and the maths around the attack using MD5. All Links and Slides will be in the description. Subscribe for more cool stuff! Slides & files - http://www.mediafire.com/view/vdbpbrabj6j50x2/BirthdayAttack.pptx Python - http://python.org/ Ubuntu - http://www.ubuntu.com/ If you like what you see be sure to subscribe and thumbs up!
Views: 22115 DrapsTV
24C3: Relay attacks on card payment -- vulnerabilities and defences
Relay attacks allow criminals to use credit or debit cards for fraudulent transactions, completely bypassing protections in today's electronic payment systems. This talk will show how using easily available electronics, it is possible to carry out such attacks. Also, we will describe techniques for improving payment systems, developed by Saar Drimer and me, in order to close this vulnerability. The UK, like many other countries, has moved from comparatively insecure magnetic stripe cards to smartcards, for electronic payment. These smartcards, capable of sophisticated cryptography, provide a high assurance of tamper resistance and while implementation standards varies, have the potential to provide good security. Although extracting secrets out of smartcards requires resources beyond the means of many would-be thieves, the manner in which they are used can still be exploited for fraud. Cardholders authorize financial transactions by presenting the card and disclosing a PIN to a terminal without any assurance as to the amount being charged or who is to be paid, and have no means of discerning whether the terminal is authentic or not. Even the most advanced smartcards cannot protect customers from being defrauded by the simple relaying of data from one location to another. We describe the development of such an attack, and show results from live experiments on the UK's EMV implementation, Chip & PIN. We discuss previously proposed defences, and show that these cannot provide the required security assurances. A new defence based is described and implemented, which requires only modest alterations to current hardware and software. This allows payment terminals to securely establish a maximum distance bound between itself and the legitimate card. As far as we are aware, this is the first complete design and implementation of a secure distance bounding protocol. Future smartcard generations could use this design to provide cost-effective resistance to relay attacks, which are a genuine threat to deployed applications. Chaos Computer Club Speaker: Steven J. Murdoch
Views: 576 Steven Murdoch
Cryptography and Formal Methods
What is it about cryptography that is so difficult to get right? What can we do to avoid flaws and vulnerabilities?
Views: 698 Galois
We're In This Logjam Thanks To Outdated Cryptography Policy
Logjam is the latest encryption vulnerability to exist thanks to software policy of the 1990s. Follow Matt Moreno : http://www.twitter.com/TheMattMoreno See more at http://www.newsy.com Transcript: A team of security researchers has found tens of thousands of websites and servers could be at risk from Logjam, a new encryption attack based on an old security mindset. Logjam is a man-in-the-middle attack, in which attackers can monitor and modify supposedly secure traffic over transport layer security, or TLS. That HTTPS on Google, for example, is one type of TLS. Logjam targets servers using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Attackers can “downgrade” the encryption strength of any affected system to make it easier to crack. (Video via Adrian, et al.) Fixing Logjam will require updating the encryption that runs on some web servers, and it might break some of the older ones. “20,000. That is how many websites may become unreachable as engineers from the biggest tech firms fix a bug appropriately named logjam,” said Bloomberg’s Emily Chang. Some industry watchers are blaming this jam on the government, and they’re actually on to something here. The Clinton administration mandated any encryption software that might be exported from the US be intentionally weakened, so it would be easier to spy on anyone using it. Until as late as 1996, some commercial crypto software was classified as munitions. (Video via C-SPAN) Restrictions were eased leading up to 2000, but the vulnerability has persisted, and some are still taking advantage of it. A Snowden report showed the NSA can decrypt traffic on virtual private networks, and the researchers say the agency is probably using Logjam to do it. The good news, if there is any, is unless you’re a system administrator, or run your own servers, there’s not much to do but update your browser. Mozilla, Apple and Google have all announced patches; Microsoft has already updated Internet Explorer. This video includes images from the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources / CC BY ND 2.0 and Getty Images. Sources: Flickr https://www.flickr.com/photos/widnr/8144771127/in/photolist-dpJ5Gp-akAGHE-akxTCt-akxTvV-akAGmj-7PUpoS-7PUpno-729eyn-oYq3JH-oFVacF-oFVoWA-oWo2SE-729bEt-7yf8eE-dzwgnB-72dbrs-58H3S6-8yRgpi-5yEcxV-8sLuQh-7PTHcQ-6mmiF-qavZ8j-pftaN8-h6e2xS-qavYXu-nRE9QF-ghoch4-7fphbw-6BVE9u-8e7D3r-6zwNA3-4V4HVs-9zsDuP-3oiixz-4ZrMAi-bk3xpR-5A8BGp-9W5yBN-f7TU-f7TP-fChWvN-f8hDzt-tz4NF-bk3y9P-9NJvrw-6ACheE-9RUC8Z-5dn5b-7FsNkF weakdh.org https://weakdh.org/logjam.html Newsy http://www.newsy.com/videos/freak-attack-courtesy-of-age-old-government-policies/ Bloomberg http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2015-05-20/some-websites-may-not-work-after-logjam-bug-fix The Daily Dot http://www.dailydot.com/politics/logjam-vpn-top-sites-vulnerability/ TechEYE http://www.techeye.net/news/clinton-and-bush-are-still-attacking-computers C-SPAN http://www.c-span.org/video/?54050-1/1994-state-union-address National Security Agency http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Agency#/media/File:National_Security_Agency_headquarters,_Fort_Meade,_Maryland.jpg Der Spiegel http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html Getty Images http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-photo-illustration-googles-chrome-browser-shortcut-news-photo/82687981 Image via: Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources / CC BY ND 2.0
Views: 489 Newsy Tech
What is DDoS?
Over the last quarter, there were approximately 500 DDoS attacks around the world with some lasting as long as 300 hours. In this Lightboard Lesson Peter Silva light up some #basics about DoS and DDoS attacks.
Views: 3741 F5 DevCentral
Charlie Miller - Mobile Threats - Hype vs. Reality
https://www.hacktivity.com/ There is a lot of hype out there about attacks on mobile devices. It's enough to make you break out that old flip phone from 2005. In this talk, I'll try to discern truth from reality. I'll discuss how mobile operating systems defend themselves as well as give examples of mobile operating system exploits. I'll clarify how easy (or hard) it is to write exploits and attack mobile devices, from the perspective of someone who has written exploits for most mobile platforms. I'll outline how easy (or hard) it is to write mobile malware and what malware of this kind can do. Finally, I'll address mobile security software and how it works (or doesn't). By the end of this talk, you'll be in a better position to determine the risk mobile devices present and differentiate the reality from the hype.
Views: 2222 hacktivity
Tor de-anonymization techniques (SHA2017)
How people have lost their anonymity? Let's study real-world cases and try to learn how to avoid these errors. Tor offers great anonymity and privacy for millions of people. However, there are some Tor de-anonymization techniques that work. This presentation demonstrates de-anonymization of Tor hidden services and users. #NetworkSecurity Juha Nurmi
Views: 1318 SHA2017
Secure Data Tokenization
DevCentral's John Wagnon highlights a solution that tokenizes secure data like credit cards to keep that data from being directly handled by the application servers.
Views: 2924 F5 DevCentral
Cryptography is a systems problem (or) 'Should we deploy TLS'
Cryptography is a systems problem (or) 'Should we deploy TLS' Given by Matthew Green, Johns Hopkins University
Views: 5668 Dartmouth
Were It So Easy: TLS in the Real World - Duo Tech Talk
Between Logjam, FREAK, POODLE, and Heartbleed, TLS hasn't had a good year. TLS is the most commonly deployed cryptographic protocol, but is notoriously difficult to both implement and deploy, resulting in widespread security issues for many of the top services on the Internet. For the past three years, we've been working to improve the global state of TLS deployment through measurement-based approaches, including tracking the impact of Heartbleed and other vulnerabilities. Based on measurement data, we conducted one of the largest-ever mass vulnerability notification campaigns, discovered failures in how Diffie-Hellman has been deployed in practice, and uncovered the Logjam attack against TLS. In this talk, we'll briefly examine what TLS is and how it fails, and present the Logjam attack. We'll also discuss ZMap, the Internet-wide network scanner we use for our research, and show how ZMap helped lead to the discovery of Logjam.
Views: 1528 Duo Security
Cryptanalysis of AES and SHA-2: how far we are from compromising worldwide encryption
Modern cryptanalysis typically deal with basic cryptographic primitives where a vulnerability might imply an unavoidable threat to a full cryptosystem. The cipher AES and the hash family SHA-2 are used in numerous theoretical constructions and applications. They were designed over 10 years ago and survived intensive cryptanalytic efforts. Despite hundreds of papers written on the subject, no weakness was discovered in either design. Only recently it was announced that the secret key of the AES cipher can be found faster than by exhaustive search by a small but noticeable factor. At about the same time the SHA-2 shortened by as little as 25 was found to be not a one-way function.
Views: 336 Microsoft Research
ShmooCon 2014: The NSA: Capabilities and Countermeasures
For more information visit: http://bit.ly/shmooc14 To download the video visit: http://bit.ly/shmooc14_down Playlist Shmoocon 2014: http://bit.ly/shmooc14_pl Speaker: Bruce Schneier Edward Snowden has given us an unprecedented window into the NSA's surveillance activities. Drawing from both the Snowden documents and revelations from previous whistleblowers, I will describe the sorts of surveillance the NSA does and how it does it. The emphasis is on the technical capabilities of the NSA, not the politics of their actions. This includes how it conducts Internet surveillance on the backbone, but is primarily focused on their offensive capabilities: packet injection attacks from the Internet backbone, exploits against endpoint computers and implants to exfiltrate information, fingerprinting computers through cookies and other means, and so on. I will then talk about what sorts of countermeasures are likely to frustrate the NSA. Basically, these are techniques to raise the cost of wholesale surveillance in favor of targeted surveillance: encryption, target hardening, dispersal, and so on.
Views: 19861 Christiaan008